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Abstract 
In response to increasing public heath expenditure, the Government of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR Government) published a consultation document in October 2010 
proposing a government-regulated “Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme”. The present study conducts 
game theoretic analysis and reveals that, under specific information structure, the implementation of 
such a proposal would result in adverse selection in medical insurance market, resulting in outcomes in 
opposition to the government’s intention. 
Keywords 
Health Insurance, Medical Financing, Game Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
Medical services in Hong Kong are segmented into public and private sectors. The public sector is 
financed by public funds, with citizens paying a proportion sufficiently low to render health care 
virtually free under most circumstances (Note 1). The private sector is profit-oriented. Since 1996, total 
medical and health care expenditure has accounted for 4.5%-5.6% of Hong Kong’s gross domestic 
product. Approximately half of which has been covered by the public sector (Note 2). 
According to the basic principles of economics, the demand for free services has no limit (although 
healthy individuals tend not to visit doctors). The public health sector cannot allocate medical services 
by market principle (e.g., highest valued “customers” get the service). Thus non-price competition is 
inevitable, with long waiting times as part of the non-monetary costs (Note 3). The aging population in 
Hong Kong creates an increasing demand for medical services, leading to an increase in the Hong 
Kong Government’s medical expenditure. The pressure for the HKSAR government to reform medical 
financing has been mounting. 
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In contrast, the private medical sector offers rapid services that the public sector cannot provide. If a 
patient is covered by medical insurance and their medical expenses do not exceed the coverage limit, 
they can avoid the exceptionally long waiting times of public medical services. If policyholders’ 
medical bill exceeds their coverage limits, the remaining balance is covered by themselves. Many of 
them may return to the public health sector. 
 
2. Medical Insurance and Adverse Selection 
If a person’s health status is unknown by an insurance company, only those who anticipate their health 
to deteriorate will purchase insurance policies. This will create pressure for premiums to rise. However, 
higher premiums will deter healthy individuals from purchasing insurance policy. This information 
asymmetry between insurance companies and potential policy holder predicts that only those with 
relatively poor health would be willing to become medical insurance policy holders. However, 
insurance companies might not be willing to offer any policy at all (Note 4). This situation is a typical 
example of “adverse selection”. Similar phenomena are observed in used car market (Note 5) and credit 
rationing (Note 6). 
Contrary to the prediction of adverse selection, the fact that a medical insurance products still exists in 
the market indicates that medical insurance is still profitable. This is resulting from insurance 
companies’ capacities to deal with the problems created by asymmetric information between insurance 
companies and policyholders, alleviating the negative impact of adverse selection. Here are some 
typical measures implemented by insurance companies: 
a) Health declaration: In principal, diseases that a policyholder has or has had should be declared or 
the insurance company may refuse compensation in the future claims, regardless of whether the 
declaration is related to the claims or not.  
b) Waiting periods: Specific diseases are not compensated and may even lead to exclusion within a 
period after the policy comes into effect. In contrast, compensation can be claimed only if an individual 
is diagnosed with one of these specific diseases after the waiting period has elapsed.  
c) Exclusion: Insurance companies may refuse to cover policyholders in relation to specific diseases 
such as pre-existing chronic illnesses. Alternatively, patients who have received large amounts of 
compensation within the previous year may be excluded during policy renewal for the relevant 
diseases.  
d) Refusal of policy renewal: Medical insurance policies are renewed every year and insurance 
companies have the right to refuse policy renewal; for example, a company can refuse if a policyholder 
has received a large amount of compensation within the previous year. 
e) Loading increases: Insurance companies may increase loadings during policy renewal. 
f) Compensation limits: An upper limit is set for very category of medical insurance compensations. 
g) Deductibles: Also known as “excess”, this is the amount to be paid by a policyholder when he or 
she claims compensation. 
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Because of these restraints, some people such as those with chronic illnesses and older people cannot 
purchase medical insurance or are charged with higher premiums.  
 
3. Brief Introduction to the Proposed “Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme” 
In October 2010, the Food and Health Bureau (FHB) published “My Health My Choice”, the second 
phase of the public consultation document for health care reform, wherein it was recommended that 
“public funding should remain the main funding source for health care supplemented by private 
funding”. “Supplemented” refers to the public paying to register for the government-regulated 
voluntary medical insurance plan (referred to in the document as “Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme”, 
hereinafter referred to as “VHIS”) (Note 7). VHIS differs from the medical insurance provided by the 
current market in the following manners: 
a) No one will be refused for the insurance and are guaranteed lifetime policy renewals. 
b) Pre-existing conditions will be covered (Note 8) but subject to waiting periods and a time-limited 
reimbursement with an upper limit. 
c) High-risk groups are insured through a “High-Risk Pool” (HRP) (Note 9). The premium limit in 
the HRP with high-risk loading is three times the amount of the “published premium” (Note 10).  
d) A no-claims bonus of up to 30% of the published premiums is provided (Note 11). 
e) The government has earmarked HK$ 50 billion to support health finance reform. The document 
suggested allocating this money for the claims of the HRP, to provide no-claims bonuses for new 
participants, and provide incentives for people to save money that can be used for premium payments 
when they are old (i.e., aged 65 years older) (Note 12). 
The scheme is open for voluntary participation, with the government promising that members of the 
public who do not participate still have access to public medical services. The Hong Kong Government 
aims to reduce their burden on medical services and increase the proportion of private services through 
arrangements similar to universal health care insurance. 
 
4. VHIS Game Theoretic Analysis 
4.1 Insurance Companies and Policyholders 
Game theoretic analysis reveals that, under simple information asymmetry, the government’s proposal 
will result in adverse selection, defeating the original purpose of the government. High-risk groups, 
older people, and individuals with pre-existing conditions can be summarized as those with higher than 
average morbidity rates hence more likely to claim insurance compensation. Currently the insurance 
industry alleviates the impact of adverse selection through the arrangements like health declaration, 
waiting period, exclusion, loading, excess, etc. listed above. The government views these measures as 
“problems”. The government’s proposal amount to including individuals who will definitely claim in 
the insurance pool. 
In the following game, insurance companies and potential policyholders are players. There are two 
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types of potential policyholders. N1 represents those with illnesses and N2 represents those who are 
healthy. There were N individuals in total such that N = N1 + N2, all of whom know whether they 
themselves are ill or healthy. However, the insurance companies know only the probability of a 
potential policyholder being ill or not, which is 1/N. They are unaware of each specific individual’s 
health status. In other words, there is 1 out of N individuals is ill. But the insurance companies do not 
know the identity of this person. The model is expressed in the following game tree: 
 
 
Figure 1. The Game between Insurance Companies and Potential Policyholders. Specific Health 
Status of Individual Potential Policyholders Unknown to Insurance Companies 
 
In this game, “Nature” first determined who will be the ill (N1) and the healthy (N2) individuals. Then 
the insurance companies decided whether to provide insurance to the N individuals. Since the insurance 
companies did not know the health status of the N individuals (i.e., who is in N1 and N2), to show this 
property of information, a dashed line links the two knots at the move by insurance companies. 
However, the insurance companies know that: 
N1
N1 + N2
=  
N1
N
=  
1
N
 
The insurance companies do know that one out of N individuals is ill, i.e., N1 = 1. Then, in the next 
move, N1 and N2 individuals decide whether to accept the policy provided by the insurance companies. 
Each policyholder has to pay a premium P in order to be insured. Each will receive a compensation I if 
he or she becomes ill. If all the N individuals purchase insurance policies, the payoff for the insurance 
company will be profit π: 
π = PN − I 
If the insurance market is perfectly competitive, π will be zero, which implied: 
PN − I = 0 
⟹ P =  (
1
N
) I 
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In other words, individual premium is equal to the probability of illness multiplied by the compensation. 
In this case it is actuarially fair insurance. 
The next move is for the potential policyholders to decide whether to accept insurance policy at 
premium P or not. For the only individual in N1, the payoff of illness is K1: 
K1 = I − P 
For each individual in N2, the payoff of illness is K2, which is: 
K2 =  −P 
Those in N1, without insurance policy, uses public medical services when ill. For the simplicity of 
analysis, we assume the value of public services is I, i.e., the same as insurance compensation, although 
the patients were not required to pay. 
The following payoff matrices list the payoffs for those N1, N2, and insurance companies playing 
different strategies: 
 
Table 1. Payoff Matrix of Those in N1 and Insurance Companies 
  N1 
  Policy accepted Policy rejected 
Insurance Companies Policy offered ([I-P], [PN-I]) (I, 0) 
Policy not offered (0, 0) (I, 0) 
 
Table 1 shows that for those in N1, the strategy “policy rejected” is strongly dominant. The insurance 
companies would not provide insurance because if only N1 individuals were insured, the payoff will be 
negative. We can see that the payoff for the insurance companies is  
π = PN1 −  I 
Because N1 (equal to 1 is this illustration) is less than N, PN1 was lower than I, denoting that the 
insurance company lost money. Consequently, the equilibrium of this game is (policy rejected, policy 
not offered). The insurance companies choose not to offer policy to N1. 
 
Table 2. Payoff Matrix of Those in N2 and Insurance Companies 
  N2 
  Policy accepted Policy rejected 
Insurance Companies Policy offered (-P, 0) (0, 0) 
Policy not offered (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Table 2 shows that for those N2, the strategy “policy rejected” was weakly dominant. Insurance policy 
is a waste of money because those in N2 know they are perfectly well and will not get any 
compensation. Thus, those in N2 are not going to apply for insurance policy. 
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4.2 The Effect of Upper Limit on Compensations 
The government proposed that pre-existing conditions would be insured subject to waiting periods and 
time-limited upper limits on compensations. Assume that the upper limit on compensation is I and 
those with pre-existing chronic illnesses will claim compensation in the future (thereby obtaining I). 
The premium is P* which is less than I. The gaming tree is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 2. The Game between Insurance Companies and Potential Policyholders, with Coverage 
on Pre-Existing Conditions and Upper Limit on Compensations 
 
Saying that pre-existing conditions ought to be covered (with restrictions) implies that the pre-existing 
conditions are known to insurance companies. Hence the insurance companies know who belongs to N1 
and N2. Therefore, the dashed line between N1 and N2 is no longer here. 
For N1, only part of the game is required examination: 
 
 
Figure 3. The Game between Insurance Companies and Those with Pre-Existing Conditions 
 
The payoff matrix is as follows: 
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Table 3. Payoff Matrix of Those in N1 and Insurance Companies, When Pre-Existing Conditions 
are Covered 
  N1 
  Policy accepted Policy rejected 
Insurance Companies Policy offered ([I-P*], [P*N1-I]) (I, 0) 
Policy not offered (0, 0) (I, 0) 
 
For those in N1, the strategy “policy rejected” is strictly dominant, indicating that whether the insurance 
companies offer policy is inconsequential. Using public health care was more cost-effective. This result 
demonstrates hat the upper compensation limit does not increase the willingness to be insured among 
individuals who is ill, nor could the insurance companies provide profitable policies. 
The payoff matrix of N2 is as follows: 
 
Table 4. Payoff Matrix of Those in N2 and Insurance Companies, When Pre-Existing Conditions 
are Covered 
  N2 
  Policy accepted Policy rejected 
Insurance Company Policy offered (-P*, 0) (0, 0) 
Policy not offered (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
For those belongs to N2, the strategy “policy rejected” is weakly dominant. Since they know their own 
health statuses, N2 individuals are not going to seek for insurance coverage, irrespective of whether the 
insurance companies offer them policy or not.  
4.3 Higher Premiums for High-Risk Individuals 
The government propose to cover high-risk individuals in VHIS. However, the premium is limited to 
three times of the published premium. Let compensation be I and the published premium was 
P =  
I
N
=  
I
N1 + N2
 
which is actuarially fair. According to the government’s proposal, the premium for the high-risk group 
is: 
3P =  
I
N
=  
3I
N1 + N2
 
In our analysis, it is assumed that higher premiums would receive more compensation without an upper 
limit. If uninsured, those in N1 (obviously high-risk individuals belong to N1) will be back to the public 
sector and obtained an equivalent of I medical services. Similar to the previous discussion, only the 
interaction between N1 and the insurance companies required examination because N2 individuals were 
not insured. 
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Figure 4. The Game between Insurance Companies and High-Risk Individuals 
 
The payoff matrix is as follows: 
 
Table 4. Payoff Matrix of Those High-Risk Individuals and Insurance Companies 
  N1 
  Policy accepted Policy rejected 
Insurance Companies Policy offered ([I-3P], [3P*N1-I]) (I, 0) 
Policy not offered (0, 0) (I, 0) 
 
For those in N1, the strategy “policy rejected” is strictly dominant, indicating that whether the insurance 
companies offer insurance policy is inconsequential. Using public medical care is more cost-effective 
for them. Eventually, a premium limit of three times the published premium did not increase 
willingness for individuals with illness to be insured, nor could the insurance companies provide 
profitable policies. In addition, older people (usually identified as high-risk) may not have sufficient 
funds to pay for the premiums and deductibles when claiming for compensation. Therefore, it is 
doubtful whether there is incentive for them to obtain voluntary medical insurance at all.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Similar to other economic models, the model in this study was excessively abstract, which resulted in 
the following extreme conclusions: Everyone will choose public medical services instead of using 
private medical services by participating in VHIS. However, this model doesn’t explain why half of all 
medical services (in terms of value) are provided by the private sector, while numerous insurance 
companies are providing an extensive range of medical insurance policies. 
Part of the explanation could be product differentiation. The medical services provided by private and 
public sectors are not the same. For example, the excessive waiting time in public sector, resulting from 
lower than equilibrium pricing, makes a big difference (Note 13). Individuals who value time efficiency 
and can afford the extra expenses will shift to the private sector for medical services. The same applies 
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to those with medical insurance policies. 
Another difference between public and private health care is medication. Since 2005, the Hospital 
Authority implemented the “Drug Formulary” system and stipulated that patients must purchase drugs 
at their own expense if using “Self-Financed Items (SFIs) with Safety Net” in the Drug Formulary 
(Note 14). These “SFIs with Safety Net” are mostly novel drugs that, while more expensive, are also 
more effective and may have far-reaching implication on well-being of the patients. In other words, 
public medical services might be perceived as “inferior” to private medical services. Such 
differentiation contributes to the incentives for patients to switch to private medical services. 
Unsurprisingly, private medical services still have markets and medical insurance companies still have 
clients. Still, it is worth noting that even individuals with medical insurance cannot rely entirely on 
private medical services mainly because of the costs involved. Policyholders must pay for deductibles 
in most compensation claim cases. Moreover, most insurance compensations have a upper limit. 
Therefore, when major medical conditions exhaust compensation, policyholders have no choice but to 
return to the public health care system. This frequently occurs among older people and patients with 
chronic illnesses. 
The insurance industry welcomes the government’s proposal. It could be explained by the HK$ 50 
billion for the high-risk pool, which will provide no-claims bonuses to some policyholders and 
subsidizing compensation for high-risk groups. The government also proposes to promote medical 
insurance with saving element. All these are favorable to the insurance industry. 
As previously mentioned, the upper limit on compensations for high-risk groups, and premium of three 
times of the published premium for high risk people did not reduce the incentive for people to choose 
public medical services. However, in reality, some high risk groups will be insured if the VHIS is 
implemented. There are always people whose risk is high enough that it is beneficial to purchase VUIS. 
With government’s subsidies, insurance companies will not lose from these policies. A upper limit on 
compensations is tantamount to forcing policyholders to be underinsured. Three times higher premium 
and upper limit on compensation will result in the rapid exhaustion of insurance compensation. 
Eventually the policyholder will return to public medical services. In the process, the insurance 
companies profit and the public sector pays the bill. Therefore, the government’s proposal does not 
reduce the proportion of the government’s medical expenses (up to HK$50 billion) but merely changes 
the allocation of expenditure. Without VHIS, government health care workers and suppliers are paid by 
the government. With VHIS, insurance companies and private hospitals and health care staff receive 
payments. 
The government’s suggests to promote medical insurance with saving element, similar to whole life 
plan. The higher premiums by policyholders when they were young enabled the insurance companies to 
invest, enabling policyholders to pay a relatively low premiums when getting older. As insurance 
companies are profit-seeking organizations, part of the investment return belongs to the insurance 
companies. The financial benefits to the insurance companies is comparable to those derived from 
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Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) (Note 15). 
The government’s consultation documents did not specify the objectives to be achieved by the VHIS or 
whether to increase the proportion of private medical services through the VHIS. However, the models 
in this study indicated that under specific conditions, many people would still use public health services. 
If this is the government’s objective, the chance of it being met is minimal.  
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Notes 
Note 1. The Hospital Authority website lists the latest public hospital service charges but does not 
mention costs for surgery visits or unspecified drugs 
(http://www.ha.org.hk/haho/ho/adm/102116c.htm). 
Note 2. See “Medical Financing Sources” (Tables 2.1 and 2.2; Figures 2.1-2.5) in the documents from 
the Food and Health Bureau website (http://www.fhb.gov.hk/statistics/download/dha/cn/tf2_0607.pdf). 
Note 3. In their reply to the members of the Legislative Council regarding the waiting times of public 
medical services in 2008, the government stated the following: “Of the more than 680,000 new cases 
registered in 2007 and 2008, almost 590,000 cases (86%) had waiting times of less than 1 year. Among 
these, more than 230,000 cases (34% of the total number of new cases) had waiting times of less than 2 
weeks, whereas approximately 150,000 cases (23%) had waiting times of 3-8 weeks. Based on these 
figures, approximately 57% of new cases were treated within 8 weeks…” These figures indicated that 
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43% of the new cases had to wait for at least 2 months. Data source: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200812/17/P200812170155.htm 
Note 4. Another aspect of this matter is that although insurance companies offer products with 
affordable premiums, claiming compensation is extremely difficult. 
Note 5. Akerlof (1970). 
Note 6. E.g., Bierman et al. (1993, Ch. 19). 
Note 7. FHB (2010, p. iv). 
Note 8. “Pre-existing conditions” refer to chronic diseases suffered before a person was insured. 
Note 9. Conceptually, the HRP is a reinsurance mechanism with a financial source that is part of the 
policy income and reinsurance premiums transferred to the pool. The Hong Kong Government 
indicated that if the pool is not self-sufficient, the government will consider injecting capital (FHB, 
2010, p. 30). 
Note 10. The consultation document does not define “published premiums”. They should refer to 
premiums in the premium table set for “Approved Health Insurance” and “Standard Health Insurance” 
established by the authority. In summary, “Standard Health Insurance” is a health insurance scheme 
where “Approved Health Insurance” meets the government’s standards of protection. “Approved 
Health Insurance” is a private sector-provided health insurance scheme approved by the government 
that meets the standards of “Standard Health Insurance”. The government proposed that the future 
premiums for “Approved Health Care” and “Standard Health Care” should be subject to government 
regulations. 
Note 11. For items 1-4, see FHB (2010, p. viii). 
Note 12. FHB (2010, p. 33). 
Note 13. In the FHB’s written reply to the members of the Legislative Council regarding cataract 
surgery in public hospitals in January 2010, they mentioned that “the average waiting time for cataract 
surgery in Hospital Authority hospitals is 36 months” 
(http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201001/27/P201001270149.htm). 
Note 14. For “Drug Formulary”, see http://www.ha.org.hk/hadf/welcome.html 
Note 15. In summary, the “Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance” stipulates that all working 
individuals and their employers are required to deposit 5% of their income (10% for self-employed 
individuals) into government-approved MPF providers (privately owned) with an upper limit of 
HK$ 2000 per month. The MPF providers charge 2% of the total assets annually as management fees. 
According to the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority website, until December 2009, “the 
net asset value of all MPF schemes passed the HK$ 300 billion mark”, indicating a management fee 
income of more than HK$ 6 billion. See 
http://www.mpfa.org.hk/tc_chi/abt_mpfs/abt_mpfs_mil/abt_mpfs_mil.html for more details. Failure to 
pay for the MPF is a criminal offense that can incur a fine or even imprisonment. 
